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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION. By Sylvia Snowiss.• New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 228. Cloth, $25.00. 
R. Kent Newmyer 2 
This short book aims to set the historical record straight about 
the origins, development, and true nature of judicial review, an issue 
that the author maintains has never been understood-except grop-
ingly by Alexander Bickel in his The Least Dangerous Branch.3 A 
"misreading" of the basic sources of judicial review for the forma-
tive years, from 1776 to Marbury v. Madison in 1803, "pervades all 
modem scholarship." What scholars have overlooked, the point 
which dooms their effort to understand subsequent developments, is 
the difference between "ordinary law" and "fundamental law," the 
latter being that which claims to control the sovereign power itself. 
Violations of fundamental law, because of the magnitude of the is-
sue, could be rectified only "by electoral or other political action," 
or wanting these, by "revolution or the threat of revolution." When 
the federal courts exercised judicial review in the pre-1801 period, 
as admittedly they did, they did so only under duress, so to speak -
only when the violation of fundamental law was unmistakably clear 
and then only "as a substitute for revolution." Judicial enforcement 
of the Constitution "was understood to be an entirely separate un-
dertaking from the judicial enforcement of ordinary law." 
All this, Snowiss argues, changed under Chief Justice John 
Marshall, indeed because of him. In his hands the Constitution lost 
its meaning "as vehicle of explicit fundamental law" and became 
"supreme ordinary law." Judicial review was no longer a last-ditch 
"revolutionary defense" but part of the regular business of the fed-
eral courts. The Constitution had been "legalized." 
This radical transformation, which took "about half a century 
to complete," was largely in place by the end of the 1820s. Mar-
shall, with "single-minded purposive skill," had taken charge of the 
Court and then put the Court in charge. Not only had he effected a 
revolution, he covered his tracks so well that neither contemporar-
ies nor subsequent students of the Court appreciated what hap-
pened. The key to his "statesmanlike deviousness"-Bickel's 
phrase cited with approval by Snowiss-lay in Marshall's subtle, 
I. Professor of Political Science, California State University, Northridge. 
2. Professor of History, University of Connecticut. 
3. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar 
of Politics (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1986). 
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manipulative conftation of fundamental law as the late eighteenth 
century understood it and the Court's work-a-day law. 
The idea that the modem doctrine of judicial review was not 
cut from whole cloth by the framers or the pre-Marshall interpret-
ers of the Constitution is, of course, not new; nor is the idea that 
Marshall was the great modernizer. What is new, and what 
Snowiss is obliged to prove, is that the pre-Marshall understanding 
of judicial review was in fact perfectly clear and not simply inchoate 
and that Marshall singlemindedly and singlehandedly perverted 
that understanding. Her argument, she tells us, will "use no new 
material but consists in a rereading of existing sources." Among 
the most important for the period up to 1788 are Sir William Black-
stone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, some but not all of 
the nine pre-1788 state cases relating to judicial review, and Max 
Farrand's Records of the federal Convention of 1788, all of which 
are treated in a chapter of forty-four pages. The key sources for the 
remainder of the pre-Marshall period are Justice James Iredell's 
pro-judicial review essay, "To the Public,"4 Hamilton's Federalist 
78, and a selection of state and federal cases on judicial review (with 
special emphasis on the Virginia case of Kamper v. Hawkins,s Jus-
tice Paterson's opinion in Vanhorn's Lessee v. Do"ance,6 and Jus-
tice Chase's in Calder v. Bul/7). James Wilson's Lectures on Laws 
also figures prominently. Little use is made of relevant secondary 
scholarship and there is no formal bibliography. 
Here is a bold thesis argued with intelligence and considerable 
force. It will, and should, enter into the heated scholarly debate 
now raging about the origins of judicial review.9 The problem, as I 
see it, is one of research design and proof. The sources used, even if 
they were analyzed in great depth, which they are not in this brief 
book, are inadequate to the large chore at hand, which is nothing 
less than a reconstitution of the constitutional understanding of the 
founding generation. There is no reference to developments before 
1776, which surely must have left some mark on the ideas of the 
Founders. Missing also is any discussion of the state debates on the 
ratification of the Constitution, even though they are no less impor-
4. To the Public, in Griffith J. McRee, ed., Life and Correspondence of James Iredell 
145-49 (Peter Smith, 1949). 
5. I Va. Cases 20 (1793). 
6. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). 
7. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
8. James Wilson, Lectures on the Law, in Robert M. McCloskey, ed., 2 The Works of 
James Wilson (Harv. U. Press, Belknap Press, 1967). 
9. See, for example: Robert L. Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (U. 
of Kansas Press, 1989); Jack M. Sosin, Aristocracy of the Lang Robe (Greenwood Press, 
1989); Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review (Basic Books, 1986). 
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tant and often more revealing than the debates at Philadelphia. Es-
pecially is this true of the definitive edition of the ratifying debates 
currently being published at the University of Wisconsin under the 
direction of John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino. Particu-
larly relevant is the Virginia ratifying convention, where John Mar-
shall spoke on the role of the federal courts under the new 
Constitution. The antifederalist critique of judicial power consti-
tutes another key source which is not consulted, and most conspicu-
ous in its absence here are the Brutus essays (probably written by 
Robert Yates) which are arguably the most prescient statement of 
the period concerning the power of the federal courts. Hamilton's 
famous Federalist 78 was in fact written to refute Brutus and can-
not, as Jack Sosin shows conclusively in his Aristocracy of the Long 
Robe,w be understood except by reference to Yates' argument. 
Sosin's excellent analysis of the documentary validity of the state 
judicial review cases also demonstrates how precarious it is to say 
anything with certainty about the meaning of these cases. 
Missing in Snowiss's account, also, is an analysis of Section 25 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, though it is directly relevant to the 
book's central thesis. That statute was framed by Oliver Ellsworth 
and James Paterson, both of whom were at the convention and both 
of whom served on the Supreme Court; it was also at the very heart 
of the antebellum debate between John Marshall and states' rights 
constitutional theorists. Most importantly, by providing statutory 
authority for judicial review of state decisions adverse to claims 
made under the Constitution, Section 25 would appear to make 
constitutional adjudication part of the ordinary legal business of the 
Supreme Court-a development which Snowiss argues came much 
later and under the cloak of darkness. The fact that both parties in 
Hylton v. U.S. 11 agreed in contriving a case that invited the 
Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of a federal statute 
taxing carriages also suggests a strong pre-Marshall tendency to-
ward regularizing judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 
Snowiss's argument concerning Marshall's role in the transfor-
mation of judicial review rests on her analysis of the pre-1801 un-
derstanding of judicial review. Thus after comparing key parts of 
Marshall's opinions to key documents from the pre-1801 period, she 
concludes that Marbury was not the radical departure that it is 
often thought to be but only prepared the ground "for judicial expo-
sition of the constitutional text that was to begin at some opportune 
time in the future." Ms. Snowiss is correct that Marbury was incon-
10. See Sosin, Aristocracy of the Long Robe (cited in note 9). 
11. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
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elusive-and her argument here is corroborated by Robert Clin-
ton's Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review.12 Its 
inconclusiveness, however, might be evidence that Marshall himself 
did not yet see the full potential of judicial review, that his ideas 
were embryonic. Snowiss does not consider this possibility, but ar-
gues instead that the Chief Justice, though his written references to 
the issues were "exceedingly brief and characteristically cryptic," 
understood the matter exactly as Snowiss herself has seen it, pre-
sumably with all the subtleties and distinctions of her own dazzling 
exegisis intact. 
The difficulty is that we don't know if and how Marshall read 
Wilson or Madison or what he got from reading Blackstone or 
many of the other sources cited by Snowiss. We do know that he 
was not inclined to scholarly analysis in either law or politics, that 
instead he had a genius for learning by listening. Would it not, 
therefore, make sense to start with the assumption that Marshall, 
however much he led his age, was also a part of it? One is reminded 
here of Justice Holmes' observation that the Chief Justice, like all 
great men, represented "a great ganglion in the nerves of society," 
that he was a "strategic point in the campaign of history, and part 
of his greatness consists in his being there."t3 
To illustrate Holmes' approach, take the idea of a written con-
stitution, which, as Snowiss correctly points out, is the foundation 
of all of his great decisions. A careful look at the Virginia ratifying 
debates indicates that the thirty-two-year-old delegate from Rich-
mond and Henrico County had already begun to see the potential of 
the fact that the supreme law was written; one sees too, in his 
speech on the federal judiciary, a clear forecast of the kind of tex-
tual analysis that would be his hallmark. But there is also evidence 
that others at the convention understood the radical potential of 
written fundamental law; and the fact that the convention decided 
to consider the Constitution clause by clause indicates that textual 
exegisis itself was already becoming part of the accepted logic of the 
written document. Marshall even as a novice statesman contributed 
to the debate, but he also learned from it. 
Or take as another example of Marshall's symbiotic relation-
ship with his age the process by which constitutional exegisis be-
came a part of the regular work of the Court. Surely part of this 
process, which Snowiss writes of in conspiratorial terms, is ex-
plained by the jurisdictional obligations imposed by Article III of 
12. See Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (cited in note 9). 
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Collected Legal Papers 267-68 (Harcourt, Brace and 
Howe, 1920). 
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the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Marshall was sim-
ply "there," as Holmes put it, when those cases which turned on the 
meaning of the Constitution presented themselves. When Marshall 
said, as he frequently did in his opinions, that he had no choice but 
to interpret the Constitution, perhaps we ought to pay attention. In 
any case, it was not Marshall alone who did the interpreting, since 
by his own admission, the deliberations of the Court were collective. 
Reasoning exclusively from appellate decisions, without benefit of 
private correspondence of any sort (even John Marshall's), is sure 
to miss the point. 
Placing Marshall and the Court in the larger context of histori-
cal change, which is the gravamen of my argument, permits us to 
see that judicial review, as it unfolds from Marbury to McCulloch v. 
Maryland and beyond, was not born as a Platonic idea in the mind 
of the Chief Justice; nor did the transformation of judicial review 
during his tenure take place unbeknownst to contemporaries. For 
all of his prescient insight, he was, like other statesmen of the 
founding period, forced to learn on the job. His view of judicial 
review changed in response to a wide range of historical changes of 
a fundamental nature: the rise of a national market, the appearance 
of sectional nationalism after the War of 1812, and particularly the 
emergence of a states' rights constitutionalism that challenged Mar-
shall and the Court at every tum. The powerful anti-court move-
ment of the 1820s-the granddaddy of all subsequent such 
movements-makes it clear that the changes in the status of the 
Court which were taking place under Marshall's astute leadership 
were well known. 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERI· 
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY. By Jennifer Nedel-
sky.I Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. xiii, 
343. $29.95. 
Mark Tushnet 2 
Jennifer Nedelsky's long-awaited discussion of Federalist theo-
ries of property is a major contribution to the literature on the foun-
ders' political theory and its relation to contemporary constitutional 
I. Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Toronto. 
2. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
